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Effect size is the basis of much evidence-based education policy making. In particular, it is 
assumed to measure the educational effectiveness of interventions. Policy is being driven by 
the influential work of John Hattie, the Education Endowment Foundation and others, which 
is grounded in this assumption. This article demonstrates the assumption is false and notes 
that, when criticized, proponents either attempt to inoculate themselves by listing (without 
checking) assumptions or use the specious reasoning that, however flawed their argument, 
no-one has disproved their conclusions. 
 
 




“1031 is prime: 31 is prime and clearly adding 1000 to a prime number changes 
nothing,” says Professor Corncrake. “Now, I have heard many people complain 
about my work and I am aware of the critiques. Indeed, I use some of them in my 
teaching. But as yet, no-one has convincingly argued that 1031 is not prime.” 
 
Of course, Professor Corncrake is wrong – not in the fact of 1031 being prime, but in the 
argument that adding 1000 to a prime number results in another prime number. Professor 
Corncrake’s defence is that the conclusion has not been proved wrong; but it does not seem 
to distinguish between concerns about that conclusion and concerns about the method. The 
conclusion happens to be correct, but the method is invalid (it works for vanishingly few 
primes). The study of number theory and its applications in, for example, keeping financial 
transactions secure, would be severely compromised if people relied on Corncrake’s 
argument or accepted his defence. 
 
This relatively straightforward example shows how important it is to distinguish between a 
conclusion and the warrant for drawing that conclusion. This paper explores how a lack of 
careful examination of the warrants for arguments is potentially misleading teachers and 
other educational policy makers when they use the ‘evidence based education’ literature.  It 
further examines the nature of the defences drawn by those who wish to promote an 
erroneous interpretation of the key measure used in this literature: effect size. 
 
The Effect Size1 in Education 
The idea of using the effect size to compare educational interventions has a long history, but 
appears to have come to world-wide prominence through the highly influential book 
“Visible Learning” by John Hattie (Hattie, 2009). The work has led to his being called 
“possibly the world’s most influential education academic” (Evans, 2012) and, according to 
Google Scholar (at the time of writing), this book has been cited nearly 10000 times.  
 
Hattie (2009) draws what he calls ‘bold speculations’ by rank ordering dozens of forms of 
educational intervention - from ‘feedback’ towards the top and ‘student control over 
learning’ towards the bottom - arguing that the rank ordering is based on a “unidimensional 
continuum … that can allow various effects on achievement to be positioned as they relate 
to each other” (p.8). That ‘unidimensional continuum’ is based on the notion of effect size. 
 
This is not the only influential work which encourages policy decisions to be grounded on 
effect size comparisons. Marzano (1998) undertook an earlier meta-meta-analysis using 
similar methods, and the notion of rank ordering interventions on the basis of effect size has 
gone on to be influential in many countries and in many subfields of education, resulting in 
a large number of publications and websites listing interventions in the order of their effect 
sizes as a proxy for their educational effectiveness. For example, in the UK, the Education 
Endowment Foundation (EEF) have developed a meta-meta-analysis toolkit, whose methods 
are based on effect size, as outlined in Higgins & Katsapataki (2016). This toolkit is even 
recommended as a source for policy making by the UK government (Department for 
Education, 2016), with two-thirds of school leaders saying they use it (EEF, 2016). Effect size 
ranking lists for subfields are also being produced, for example Schneider & Preckel (2017) 
give a rank ordering for higher education.  
 
Eacott (2017) argues that Hattie’s work has become the “dominant feature in contemporary 
educational leadership rhetoric in Australia” (p.414) and it can be argued that these similar 
approaches lie behind the key drivers of educational policy in other countries (Simpson, 
2017). Thus far, the critiques of these approaches to combining studies and extracting policy 
proposals has focused on the difficulties with aggregating them in meta-analyses and meta-
meta-analyses (Eysenck, 1984;  Berk, 2007; Higgins and Simpson, 2011). This paper discusses 
the nature of what is being combined – the effect size – explores whether the assumptions 
made about what effect size represents hold and considers the nature of the defences used 
by proponents in the face of problems with their arguments and assumptions. 
 
The basis of the argument 
                                                     
1 Throughout this paper, ‘effect size’ will stand for ‘standardised effect size’ (as it does in the 
literature cited). While not exempt from all critique, raw effect size (where, for example, 
differences in scores are not scaled by a measure of variance) is not subject to some of the 
most serious problems noted here. 
Each of the meta-meta-analytic rank orderings is based on comparing aggregated effect 
sizes.  For the simplest of controlled trials, the effect size is defined as the difference 
between the mean score for the intervention group and the mean score for the control 
group, divided by some measure of the spread of those scores (such as the pooled standard 
deviation of the scores of the two groups). In meta-analyses, the effect sizes for a set of 
trials are averaged to purportedly give a more accurate estimate of the effect size of the 
intervention. In meta-meta-analyses, meta-analyses are still further combined under 
broader headings (such as ‘homework’ or ‘teacher training’) to provide an estimate of the 
effect size for classes of interventions. Finally, these broad areas are compared to provide 
the rank ordering, distinguishing “what are and what are not key influences on 
achievement” (Hattie, 2009, p15). 
 
Fundamental to this work is the idea that effect size is a reasonable measure of the 
‘influence on achievement’, that higher effect sizes are associated with larger influences and 
that interventions with similar educational influence have similar effect sizes.  
 
Unfortunately, this is not the case. 
 
Effect size is a measure of the trial as a whole; it is not a measure of the intervention. It tells 
us something about how clear the difference is between the intervention group and the 
control group on the outcome measure, not how educationally important or influential the 
intervention is. Simpson (2017) notes that effect size can be grossly affected by simple 
changes to any of the fundamental elements of a trial (the population from which the 
sample is selected, the activities undertaken by the control group, the chosen measure etc.). 
A simple thought experiment immediately shows that effect size cannot be taken as a valid 
measure of educational importance since it fails the basic validity requirement that the 
same intervention (with the same sample and control activity) should not result in very 
different effect sizes. 
 
The Effect Size of a Thought Experiment 
Imagine a sample of pupils drawn independently at random from some target population of, 
say, English speakers. That sample is randomly split into two groups. One group is told only 
one isolated fact - that the English translation of the Hungarian word ‘oktatás’ is ‘education’ 
- the other group gets no information at all. Both groups are then immediately given a test 
requiring them to translate ten Hungarian words into English. 
 
The test contains the word ‘oktatás’ and nine other unfamiliar Hungarian words. Assuming 
that none of the pupils have any previous knowledge of Hungarian, the experimental group 
will likely score a mean of 1 out of 10 with very small standard deviation (almost everyone 
getting ‘oktatás’ and only ‘oktatás’ correct); the control group will likely score a mean of 0 
out of 10 with a very small standard deviation (almost everyone getting no words correct). 
The effect size would be arbitrarily large: a difference of 1 divided by a standard deviation of 
near to zero (give or take the occasional lucky guess). In Hattie’s (2009) terms, this would 
make the teaching of a single word of Hungarian the largest influence on achievement ever 
recorded. The EEF, who try to give meaning to the rather abstract notion of an effect size by 
scaling it to somehow represent ‘months’ progress’, would have to declare this as the 
equivalent of many decades of additional progress in school (Higgins & Katsipataki, 2016). 
 
However, if effect size is to work in the way required for producing ranked lists of effective 
educational interventions, it must have the property that very similar interventions have 
very similar effect sizes and, in particular, identical interventions (on identical samples and 
with other experimental design features fixed) have to have near identical effect sizes. 
 
This is not the case: simple modifications to some aspects of the test in the thought 
experiment (without changing the intervention, sample or any other aspect of the trial) can 
drastically change the effect size: 
 
a) If the test does not include the word ‘oktatás’, we would expect the effect size to be 
close to zero (everyone in both groups will likely score zero and any lucky guessing 
would be balanced in expectation between groups).  
b) If the test contains ‘oktatás’ and one Hungarian word sufficiently similar to an 
English word that it might be guessed correctly by about half of the students (e.g. 
‘mobil’), the experimental group will still most likely score 1 mark more than the 
control (averaging 1.5 to the control group’s 0.5) but the standard deviation is no 
longer effectively zero, it is around 0.25 (from the variation in guessing). So, the 
effect size will be around 4. 
c) If the original set of test words were used in a multiple choice test with four options, 
then some answers will be entirely randomly guessed correctly (by both groups). The 
experimental group would be near perfect on ‘oktatás’, while the control group 
would be no better than chance on this. The control group would be expected to 
score around 2.5 marks, with a standard deviation which works out to around 1.4; 
the experimental group would get around 3.25 marks (one question almost certainly 
right and a quarter of the remaining 9 randomly correct), with a standard deviation 
of around 1.3 (there is slightly less variance as they are guessing on fewer questions). 
The effect size ends up being around 0.6. 
d) If the multiple choice test envisaged in (c) had 20 questions (one being ‘oktatás’ and 
none of the others being familiar to anyone) instead of 10, the effect size ends up 
being around 0.4: the mean difference remains the same, but the standard deviation 
is multiplied by around 1.4. With 40 questions, the effect size is around 0.3, and so 
on. 
 
In each of these examples the educational intervention (and control activity and population 
and sample size etc.) is exactly the same. In the thought experiment, the educational 
influence of the intervention has to be considered to be the same, as the educational 
outcome is the same - one group of people learn a single word of Hungarian more than the 
other group -  yet the effect size varies from 0 to 0.4, to 0.6, to 4, to infinity.  
 
Indeed, the choice of test might even lead to a negative effect size: imagine that the 
multiple choice test did not ask for the translation of ‘oktatás’ but ‘okádás’, giving the 
options ‘pelican’, ‘teacher’, ‘vomit’ and ‘purple’. It is easy to imagine that the control group 
would distribute their answers evenly across the four options, but that the intervention 
group would disproportionately select the incorrect answer ‘teacher’, making the 
reasonable - if mistaken - assumption that words which seem similar have similar meanings, 
particularly in the context of the immediately preceding intervention. 
 
This simple thought experiment shows that effect size cannot be a proxy for educational 
effectiveness or influence: exactly the same intervention, evaluated slightly differently, can 
result in effect sizes with widely different magnitudes and even potentially different signs. 
Moreover, altering the measure is not the only way to make very large changes in resulting 
effect size: in more complex interventions choosing a different control activity or reducing 
noise by selecting a more homogenous sample can make large differences even though the 
treatment received by the intervention group is identical. 
 
One might question whether this thought experiment reflects real experience. On the one 
hand, the thought experiment is eminently implementable; on the other hand, there is 
ample evidence in the literature that the same intervention, on the same sample, with all 
other design features (except the test) held constant can lead to radically different effect 
sizes, showing that we cannot equate the effect size with the educational influence of the 
intervention. 
 
The evaluation of a phonics intervention used the ‘New Group Reading Test’ (NGRT), a 
single word reading test (SWRT) and a Phonics Assessment Battery (PhAB) as outcome 
measures (Merrell and Kasim, 2015). For otherwise the same experiment (same 
intervention on the same sample, with the same control activities) they reported effect sizes 
0.43, 0.38 and 0.23 respectively. While the evaluation team preselected one (NGRT) as their 
primary measure, a different evaluation of the same experiment could make a different 
choice and obtain a very different effect size. 
 
The REACH targeted reading support programme evaluation (Sibieta, 2016) used the NGRT 
as the primary outcome and a reading comprehension score and a reading accuracy score as 
secondary outcomes. They found effect sizes of 0.33; -0.08 and 0.17 respectively. While the 
evaluators had pre-selected NGRT as the primary outcome, different evaluators looking at 
exactly the same intervention with other measures would have drawn quite different 
conclusions. In the ‘months’ progress’ metric of the EEF we would be forced to conclude 
that the same intervention led to 4 months’ progress, 2 months’ progress and 1 month’s 
regress. 
 
The Nuffield Early Language Intervention evaluation (Sibieta, Kotecha and Skipp, 2016) 
involved a primary outcome (which was the composite of four measures) and a secondary 
outcome (the composite of three other measures). The effect sizes were 0.27 and 0.06 
respectively. Again, the evaluators pre-selected a measure to count as ‘the effect size’, but 
different evaluators of the same intervention (in the same sample, with the same control 
activities etc.) could have chosen differently and drawn very different conclusions.  
 
These real examples will, of course, be influenced by many other factors (not least 
measurement errors, differential attrition etc.) but alongside the thought experiment they 
show that the researchers’ design decision to select (or develop) a test has a radical impact 
on effect size.  Since otherwise identical experiments (the same intervention, sample, 
control group activity etc.) leads to radically different effect sizes depending of the 
researchers’ selection of design features, it cannot be said to be a measure of the 
educational importance of an intervention. Larger effect sizes are not necessarily indicators 
of increased educational influence: they may be due to test selections or other design 
features. 
 
What does effect size actually measure? 
Effect size is a measure of the clarity of the experimental difference between an 
intervention and a control group and it will be influenced by the design choices made by 
researchers. Indeed, as they seek increased statistical power (that is, their chance of finding 
a difference between groups, should it exist), any decision which does so (apart from 
increasing sample size or choice of statistical test) increases effect size. Indeed, for a fixed 
sample size, choice of statistical test and significance level, power and effect size are 




Figure 1. The relationship between power and effect size for a fixed sample size (in this case 
N=80), significance level (=0.05) and statistical test (a two sample, two sided t-test). 
 
As above, researchers can choose different tests (or even simply different lengths of a test). 
Or they can choose more or less restricted populations from which to draw their sample. 
They can have the control groups undertake different forms of alternative intervention. In 
each case, without changing the intervention (and, therefore, without altering its 
educational importance), they can vary the resulting effect size. Put another way – the 
enemy of clarity being noise – anything which acts to increase the noise of an experiment 
(multiple choice tests instead of open responses; heterogeneous samples; lower 
intervention dosage;  increased interval between intervention and testing etc.) will decrease 
effect size.  
 
Real educational environments are very noisy places (in many senses, but particularly in the 
statistical sense): the job of a researcher is often to amplify the signal so that it stands out 
from the noise. That is, they will make design decisions which increase effect size, within 













Thus, even though the argument here shows that effect size should have no role in 
educational policy, it does have a technical role in research. It can tell future researchers 
using similar tests (and samples and control activities) something about the noisiness they 
might expect, allowing them to adjust sample size, reduce heterogeneity of the sample, 
select and modify measures, increase contrast with the control etc. as appropriate. The 
problem comes when, in mistakenly associating larger effect size with increased educational 
effectiveness, policy makers select between interventions. This may happen most often with 
meta-analysis and meta-meta-analysis2, but happens also when comparing individual 
studies (e.g. Gorard, Siddiqui & See 2017). 
 
With the REACH intervention, rather than concluding that the experiment was relatively 
clear when measured on the NGRT and rather unclear when measured on reading 
comprehension, the identification of effect size with educational influence would mean we 
would have to conclude the same intervention was both quite influential and rather non-
influential. This makes little sense. Similarly, for the Nuffield Early language intervention: the 
mistaken identification of effect size with importance would lead to contradictory 
conclusions while the correct identification of effect size as experimental clarity would allow 
us to note that the difference between treatments on the sample was unclear when 
measured on the second test and rather clearer when measured on the first.  
 
Whether the intervention is influential or not is a matter for professional judgement in 
context. It cannot be abandoned in favour of a numerical scale of experimental clarity, 
which is dependent on design features such as test selection, control activity and sample 
homogeneity. 
 
However, even in the legitimate research use of effect size as a measure of experimental 
clarity, researchers’ abilities to make those design choices can be more or less limited: 
depending on the context, researchers may struggle to remove noise from signal in their 
experiment. In simple, direct instruction contexts (such as the example in the thought 
experiment), researchers may have free rein in their choice of population, measure and 
control group activity. However, less direct influences may allow for less opportunity to 
increase experimental power by adjusting these factors. In behavioural intervention studies, 
it is likely to be unethical to use a ‘no behavioural intervention’ control and one is likely to 
use a standardised measure of achievement rather than a researcher designed one3. In the 
                                                     
2 The argument from some meta-analysts is that all of the different design influences will 
‘wash out’ when a large number of studies gets combined. But this relies on the obviously 
absurd assumption that studies are drawn independently and at random with the same 
distribution from a population of those design decisions: control activities, intervention-
testing intervals, dosages etc. As if, for example, tests used in studies are selected at 
random from a population of possible tests so that the number of open answer vs multiple 
choice tests ‘balances out’ in some way. See Berk (2007, 2011). 
3 Cheung & Slavin (2016) noted that, across their sample of studies, researcher designed 
measures resulted in effect sizes on average twice the size of those from studies with 
independently designed measures. The reason for this follows directly from the thought 
experiment here: researchers can (and do) reduce noise by designing tests which target only 
the impact of the intervention; standardised tests will not do so. Though, of course, 
earlier examples of real projects which give different effect sizes, the restriction on the 
choice of tests is imposed by the funding body. 
 
The appearance of direct instruction interventions like feedback and meta-cognition at the 
top of meta-meta-analytic tables should be taken only as evidence that researchers have 
found it easier to conduct less noisy experiments in these areas compared to behaviour 
interventions or summer schools. It is a mistake to argue that it means feedback or meta-
cognition are more influential educational interventions. 
 
A Fundamental Category Error 
Mistaking effect size for a measure of educational importance or influence is, then, a 
category error. But a category error can be more or less serious. A personal shopper who 
selects trousers for their customers on the basis of their height rather than their inside leg 
measurement is making a category error, but there is a close correlation between the two 
and one might expect the trousers to fit on a few occasions. Making the selection based on 
the length of the customer’s surname is a larger category error: there is no obvious 
correlation between the two and the fit would not be expected to be better than random 
(even though the process is systematic). 
 
There is little obvious reason to believe that educational influence is even closely correlated 
to study clarity (or lack of noise). If effect size was somehow a measure of educational 
influence, it would be expected to be independent of researchers’ design choices (which it is 
clearly not); as a measure of experimental clarity, we would expect it to be dependent on 
design (in the ways shown above). In the thought experiment, the educational importance 
of teaching a single word of Hungarian would appear very low, but with such a direct form 
of instruction, it is easy for researchers to select a measure with as high a signal-to-noise 
ratio as they like. 
 
Indeed, ‘educational influence’ is surely a context bound concept: teaching a single word of 
Hungarian would otherwise seem trivial, but knowing that word as you search among a 
Bucharest university campus for the building holding the education conference might make 
it appear more important. Or, learning this one word in the context of starting to learn a 
new language might make learning it mildly educationally important while learning it as a 
one-off in the context of a psychology memory study might make it educationally trivial.  
 
Equally, in another context, an educationally influential effect might (in the presence of 
much noise) result in a very small effect size. A programme which very effectively teaches 
people lifesaving CPR (cardiopulmonary resuscitation) might result in a smaller effect size if 
tested on a widely heterogenous sample (with people across a wide range of pre-existing 
knowledge of CPR); if measured using a standardised first aid test (rather than a CPR specific 
test); if compared to a somewhat less effective teaching method (rather than no CPR 
teaching whatsoever). Teaching people CPR – in the right context – may be educationally 
very important (literally lifesaving) and this intervention could be a very effective way of 
delivering it, no matter that the study results in a small effect size. If we read effect size as a 
                                                     
researchers can (and do) still select standardised tests to reduce noise and amplify the 
signal. 
measure of practical significance or educational influence, rather than a measure of 
experimental clarity, we might dismiss an approach which could be very important indeed.  
 
Some might think that this criticism of the identification of effect size with educational 
influence is merely technical or only applies to meta-analysis (or meta-meta-analysis) and 
technical fixes will make the problems disappear. While combining this flawed identification 
with the conceptual flaws in meta-analysis (Berk, 2007) magnifies the problem, the criticism 
is fundamental. If exactly the same intervention on the same sample, compared to the same 
control activity leads to radically different numerical outcomes, those numbers cannot be 
measures of educational effectiveness. 
 
It should be noted that if – and only if – the same intervention is undertaken in multiple 
studies with the same sample, compared to the same control activity, measured on the 
same outcome (and using the same study design and statistical analysis), then one can 
combine the effect sizes from those studies. Moreover, if different interventions are 
evaluated on the same sample, against the same control activity, with the same outcome 
measure, design and statistical analysis, then relative effect size may tell us which has been 
more effective. Of course, in such cases, one might just as well work with raw effect size 
(Baguley, 2009). In reality, direct replications and comparisons of this sort do not happen 
and are not the basis of ‘evidence based policy’.  
 
Defending against the Criticisms 
The failure of effect size to act as a proxy for educational effectiveness should lead us to 
question previous policy decisions based on comparing them or combining them. Yet 
responses to demonstrations which refute the logic of these arguments or which show that 
meta-analyses and meta-meta-analyses make assumptions which are obviously false (Berk, 
2007; Bergeron, 2017; Simpson, 2017) take predictable defensive forms. Freedman (2009) 
listed forms of defence offered by those whose statistical arguments have been exposed as 
flawed: 
 
The assumptions are reasonable.  
The assumptions don’t matter.  
The assumptions are conservative.  
You can’t prove the assumptions are wrong. … 
We’re only doing what everybody else does.  
Now we use more sophisticated techniques.  
If we don’t do it, someone else will.  
What would you do?  
The decision-maker has to be better off with us than without us. … 
Where’s the harm? (p 212) 
 
Many of these arguments are clearly visible in the defences offered by some of the key 
players in promoting effect size for setting policy. For example, the first three forms of 
defence are implicit when authors simply list the assumptions, without checking whether 
they hold. For example, Schneider and Preckel (2017) note, amongst other assumptions 
which need to hold for an educational meta-meta-analysis rank ordering to be meaningful: 
the need for treatment intensity in different studies to be comparable; the need for 
different meta-analyses to use similar inclusion/exclusion criteria; the need to avoid meta-
analyses which focus on teaching methods which might be disproportionately suited to 
particular content. Similarly, Higgins & Katsipataki (2016) list concerns about publication 
bias, failure to account for nesting or clustering of schools and comparability of 
implementation.  
 
Berk (2007) analysed this defence strategy: the response to “the mismatch between a meta-
analysis model and anything real …[is that] … the requisite assumptions are listed, but not 
defended. A list of the assumptions by itself apparently inoculates the meta-analysis against 
modelling errors” (p.264). Despite listing a few underlying assumptions, Schneider & Preckel 
(2017) and Higgins & Katsipataki (2016) do not check whether they hold in their own data, 
and prima facie these and many other assumptions necessary for valid arguments are not 
met. In particular, as shown here, simple measure validity (whether the measure 
corresponds to its proposed use) is violated: effect size is not a valid measure of educational 
influence. 
 
Another of the defence strategies identified by Freedman (2009) is to claim that the results 
should stand because the critics have not proved the assumptions wrong. Just as Professor 
Corncrake argues that no-one has shown that 1031 is not a prime number, many who 
continue to use effect size to stand for educational effectiveness seem unable to separate a 
flawed argument from the possibility that some of the conclusions may be spuriously 
correct (but may equally be wildly incorrect). For example, despite the criticisms of his 
warrant, Hattie (2017) argues that his headline conclusions have not yet been falsified: 
 
“there have been critics of some of the data, re-interpretations from some of the 
meta-analyses, but so far no critique (that I know about) about the ‘bold 
speculations’ about seeing learning through the eyes of the students, enabling 
students to become their own teachers, the value of success criteria, the premise of 
‘Know thy impact’ in its many forms, the role of relationships and trust to allow for 
error and misconceptions to come to the fore, about the power of giving and 
receiving feedback, the focus on learning strategies in the context of the subject 
domain, making schools inviting places for students to come and learn, and focusing 
on the learning lives of students.” [p.428] 
 
We do not yet know whether feedback is generally a better intervention than homework or 
whether homework is better than teacher training – arguably, these are not even well 
formed educational questions – so we are not able to falsify (nor confirm) Hattie’s “bold 
speculations”, but we can note that the invalid form of argument that he uses (along with 
the EEF; Marzano, 1998; Schneider & Preckel, 2017 and others) does not allow their 
conclusions to be drawn. It certainly means we should not be basing policy on them. 
 
Freedman’s (2009) final form of defence is “where’s the harm?”: Forms of intervention are 
promoted as more effective when, in fact, the evidence merely indicates they are areas in 
which it may be easier to conduct clearer studies. This misidentification is leading policy, 
driving the use of scarce resources and causing major changes in teaching methods.  
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